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Big Brother is Scanning: The
Widespread Implementation of ALPR
Technology in America’s Police
Forces
ABSTRACT
Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are an increasingly
popular tool in police departments across the United States. At its core,
ALPR technology functions in a relatively simple manner. The
technology has two major components: the actual scanners, which record
license plates, and the databases which collect, compile, and analyze this
information for officers to access at the click of a button. Although this
technology first came to the United States in 1998 as a form of
rudimentary border security, its purpose and capabilities have rapidly
grown. Now, in 2022, ALPR has evolved into a frighteningly powerful
piece of technology, potentially capable of creating a system of mass
government surveillance and chilling various constitutional protections.
This Note acknowledges that this technology has bolstered the police’s
ability to fight crime, but argues that its use must be limited through
appropriate judicial action and regulatory measures to protect the
privacy of all US citizens.
This Note proposes the following reforms to address this
issue: (1) a shift in the way the judiciary permits ALPR technology to be
used by police; (2) new federal legislation to limit the aggregation and
retention of this data; and (3) the creation of a federal agency to monitor
ALPR databases. While some academics have proposed a new
evidentiary standard within the judicial process and are creating federal
legislation to better address the threats posed by ALPR, this Note’s
solution specifically ensures that this technology does not infringe on the
constitutional rights of US citizens and the information collected is
properly stored.
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On October 25, 2017, Eric J. Richard was driving his car when a
Louisiana Police Trooper stopped him for reportedly following the car
ahead of him too closely.1 After Richard pulled over, the trooper asked
him where he was coming from.2 The trooper, however, already knew
the answer to this question.3 He knew that Richard had crossed the
1.
See United States v. Richard, No. 2:18-CR-00355-01, 2019 WL 4011489, at *1
(W.D. La. July 24, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-CR-00355-01,
2019 WL 4014325 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2019); see also Louisiana Court Case Reveals
Extensive Driver Tracking System, THENEWSPAPER.COM (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.thenewspaper.com/news/67/6786.asp [https://perma.cc/XV7J-QY4S] (summarizing the facts in Richard, 2019
WL 4011489).
2.
Richard, 2019 WL 4011489, at *1.
3.
See id.
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border into Texas earlier in the day.4 He also knew that Richard had
recently entered back into Louisiana before the traffic stop.5 The
trooper knew this information before he even exited his squad car
because he was able to quickly search Richard’s license plate using
Automatic License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology to track Richard’s
movements across state lines.6 When Richard responded that he was
simply coming from his job, the trooper viewed this as an “apparent lie”
and extended the stop.7 The trooper had no reason to track Richard
prior to this stop, but because Richard’s answer did not line up with the
ALPR data, Richard was subjected to extensive questioning and was
eventually arrested for a different crime altogether.8 Richard’s story is
one of many, as more and more inhabitants of the United States are
being subjected to police stops utilizing this highly invasive technology.9
ALPR scanners and the databases that compile data from the
scans have become vital tools for US police forces.10 While ALPR
technology and the databases supporting them have been called a
breakthrough because they provide officers the ability to identify
vehicles associated with crimes, they also create significant privacy
concerns, especially when considering the magnitude of data being
collected and retained from US citizens’ travels.11 Although a viable tool
for policing, modern ALPR poses a serious threat to Fourth Amendment
privacy protections because of the intrusiveness of this technology.
However, the industry is largely unregulated, and a lack of judicial
clarity has furthered ambiguity over whether the use of this technology

4.
See id.
5.
See id.
6.
See id.
7.
See Louisiana Court Case Reveals Extensive Driver Tracking System, supra note 1.
8.
See id.
9.
See, e.g., Randy L. Dryer & S. Shane Stroud, Automatic License Plate Readers: An
Effective Law Enforcement Tool or Big Brother’s Latest Instrument of Mass Surveillance? Some
Suggestions for Legislative Action, 55 JURIMETRICS 225, 238 (2015) (discussing United States v.
Lurry, 483 Fed. App’x 252 (6th Cir. 2012), a case in which the Defendant was stopped and subjected
to an invasive search based on data collected by an ALPR).
10.
See AXON AI & POLICING TECH. ETHICS BD., AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS 5
(2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/5dadec937f5c1a2b9d
698ba9/1571679380452/Axon_Ethics_Report_2_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6V9C-2G4H];
Tom
Simonite, AI License Plate Readers Are Cheaper—So Drive Carefully, WIRED (Jan. 27,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-license-plate-readers-cheaper-drive-carefully/
[https://perma.cc/N8HJ-BHQW] (describing how New York police forces have embraced plate reading technology).
11.
See Automatic License Plate Readers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/location-tracking/automatic-license-plate-readers [https://perma.cc/E8UZ-TPJT] (last
visited Dec. 14, 2021) (highlighting ACLU’s concerns over the invasiveness of ALPR technology).
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implicates constitutional protections.12 Additionally, government and
private sector investments have led to rapid advancement in ALPR
scanners and databases, turning this once-remedial technology limited
to border security into a powerful technology being rapidly
implemented in police forces nationwide.13
In Richard’s case, he challenged the constitutionality of the
police’s use of ALPR technology which led to his arrest, but the court
chose to avoid the issue altogether.14 Instead, the court held that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and arrest
Richard on grounds separate from the ALPR search.15 This case
exemplifies a common trend in both state and federal courts of simply
avoiding addressing the actual constitutionality of police use of ALPR
in its modern form by ruling on alternative merits and issues entirely.16
This Note begins by describing the background and current state
of ALPR technology and then explains why the courts’ current approach
to issues that arise from ALPR is ineffective.17 Part II addresses the
history of ALPRs, beginning with the technology’s origin in the United
Kingdom. Part III details relevant case law in federal and state courts
that outline the current judicial approach to addressing ALPR. Part IV
“analyzes the approach that courts currently use to analyze the Fourth
Amendment issues which arise out of the use of ALPR technology by
police.” Finally, Part V proposes that the US Supreme Court directly
address the rising privacy concerns over this technology.

12.
See id. (“This information is often retained for years, or even indefinitely, with few or
no restrictions to protect privacy rights.”).
13.
See Simonite, supra note 10.
14.
See United States v. Richard, No. 2:18-CR-00355-01, 2019 WL 4011489, at *3 (W.D.
La. July 24, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-CR-00355-01, 2019 WL 4014325
(W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2019).
15.
See id. at *3–4.
16.
See id.
17.
See infra Parts II–IV.
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I. THE HISTORY OF ALPR TECHNOLOGY
A. The Origins of ALPR
In February 1974, a vehicle carrying soldiers and families in
northern England was bombed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).18
Twelve people were killed instantly, and another fourteen were gravely
injured.19 In the following years, IRA bombs killed and wounded
hundreds or more people in the United Kingdom, most often in
London.20 These events sparked the creation of the first form of ALPR
technology.21
Because the bombs were frequently car bombs or otherwise
brought into the city with vehicles, London’s police force created a
system that used closed-circuit television (CCTV) to monitor and record
the license plates of vehicles entering and leaving major roadways.22
The program was further developed under the “Project Laser” plan.23
Police officers were able to utilize the information captured by CCTV to
monitor license plates in order to identify and stop vehicles connected
to the IRA terrorist attacks or other serious crimes.24 The program was
a great success, and the technology behind this system was coined
Automatic Number-Plate Recognition (ANPR).25
In 1993, the ANPR system was incorporated into police forces all
around London as part of the “Ring of Steel” camera network.26 As a
result, thousands of individuals connected to IRA bombings and other
serious crimes were located and prosecuted.27 Inevitably, ANPR’s great
18.
Timeline—Worst IRA Bomb Attacks on Mainland Britain, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-security-bombings-idUKTRE74F31Q20110516/
[https://perma.cc/D6KN-PKZK] (May 16, 2011, 6:49 AM).
19.
See id.
20.
See id.
21.
See History of ANPR, ANPR INT’L, http://www.anpr-international.com/history-ofanpr/ [https://perma.cc/VYU5-DVLM] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021); City of London’s Ring of Steel
Security, CITY SEC. MAG. (July 18, 2018), https://citysecuritymagazine.com/police-partnerships/city-of-london-police-ring-of-steel/ [https://perma.cc/KZ9C-NMJN].
22.
See
KEITH GIERLACK, SHARA WILLIAMS, TOM LATOURRETTE, JAMES
M. ANDERSON, LAUREN A. MAYER & JOHANNA ZMUD, LICENSE PLATE READERS
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 7 (2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR467.html [https://perma.cc/JN6V-C6AH]; Lauren Fash, Automated License
Plate Readers: The Difficult Balance of Solving Crime and Protecting Individual Privacy, 78 MD.
L. REV. ONLINE 63, 64 (2019).
23.
See GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 22.
24.
See id.
25.
See id.
26.
See History of ANPR, supra note 21.
27.
See GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 22.
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success in countering terrorism and combating general crime in London
lead to other police forces outside of the city adopted the technology.28
In 1997, the Police National ANPR Data Centre (NADC) was formed,
allowing police officers to access and analyze all ANPR data captured
in the United Kingdom irrespective of local police department
territorial boundaries or counties lines.29 The NADC centralized all
police ANPR data collected by scanners in the United Kingdom,
revolutionizing the way this data could be accessed.30 The rapid
development and success of this technology did not go unnoticed, and
by 1998 the technology made its way across the Atlantic into North
America.31
B. ALPR’s Rise in the United States
In 1998, the United States Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
implemented this technology, similarly called ALPR, to increase border
security.32 ALPR showed great promise and was championed as an
advancement of technology for US border security.33 CBP used ALPR
technology not only to monitor official entrances into the United States,
but also remote portions of the border where vehicles commonly carry
criminals with drugs, laundered money, or even victims of human
trafficking.34 After seeing the technology’s initial success, CBP
expanded the use of these scanners, implementing them as far inland
as possible to combat border-related crime.35 While the technology was
originally intended solely for use at the border, the government soon
found that its capabilities exceeded such a limited application.36
28.
See id.
29.
See History of ANPR, supra note 21.
30.
See id.
31.
See Treasury and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999: Hearing
on S. 2312 Before the Subcomm. on Treasury & Gen. Gov’t of the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
105th Cong. 147 (1998) [hereinafter Treasury and General Government Appropriations] (“funding
was provided in fiscal year 1998 for automatic license plate readers as part of the first phase of
Land Border Automation initiative . . . .”); see also GIERLACK ET AL., supra note 22 (explaining how
license plate readers were first used by the U.S. Border Patrol).
32.
See Treasury and General Government Appropriations, supra note 31; GIERLACK ET
AL., supra note 22.
33.
See Fash, supra note 22, at 65 (discussing the success of ALPR in monitoring US borders).
34.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-049, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR CBP LICENSE PLATE READER TECHNOLOGY 5 (2017).
35.
See Jay Stanley, More Federal License Scanners Reported, ACLU (June 21, 2012, 12:15
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/more-federal-licensescanners-reported [https://perma.cc/ERC8-WGVN].
36.
See Fash, supra note 22, at 64–65.
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Eventually, police departments caught on to the potential of this
technology, and after initial investments by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and later investments by the private sector,
ALPR technology rapidly grew in the United States.37
Today, ALPR technology scans thousands of vehicles without
drivers’ consent or knowledge.38 Typically no bigger than a box of
tissues with a single exposed lens, ALPR scanners can be easily
mounted onto vehicles of any size.39 These scanners are often hidden in
plain sight and are discreetly mounted on not only police cars and
emergency vehicles, but also tow trucks, traffic lights, and street
poles.40 The scanners are typically hardwired to power and are thus
always on, actively capturing and recording data from all cars that pass
through its view, regardless of whether or not there is an infraction
taking place.41 Both technological advancements and innovation in
ALPR technology have driven down the costs of production and
increased the capabilities of scanners in recent years.42 Over the last
decade, scanners have gone from simply capturing license plates to
recording vehicles’ make and model, noting distinguishable marks, and
even detecting what is in the tow.43
C. Modern-Day ALPR Capabilities
As of 2022, an average ALPR scanner can scan and capture
thousands of cars’ license plates in only one minute, completely
unbeknown to their owners.44 Once captured, the data from each license
37.
Julia M. Brooks, Drawing the Lines: Regulation of Automatic License Plate Readers in
Virginia, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2019) (attributing rapid growth in ALPR to advancing technology and a “$50 million in grants to local police departments from the Department of Homeland
Security”).
38.
See id. at 1.
39.
Id.
40.
See id. (“They can be mobile, attached to police vehicles and tow trucks, or
stationary, posted on traffic lights or street poles. Although appearances vary, a typical ALPR is a
rectangular box slightly smaller than a box of tissues with a circular lens visible on one end. When
attached to the trunk of a vehicle, ALPRs appear in pairs pointing past the vehicle’s tail lights.”).
41.
See id. at 2.
42.
See Simonite, supra note 10 (commenting on how ALPR have become cheaper and
widely accessible to police departments through investment in the private sector).
43.
See Louise Matsakis, Flock Safety Says Its License Plate Readers Reduce Crime. It’s
Not That Simple, WIRED (Oct. 24, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/flock-safety-license-plate-readers-crime/ [https://perma.cc/9VEQ-LZZ2] (noting that the Flock LPRs are
capable of detecting people walking by, and whether they have a dog in tow).
44.
See Ángel Díaz & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal
Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10,
2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-
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plate, which includes the date and time, is saved to a database.45 These
databases are both public and private, and several private companies
actively boast about their extensive databases to incentivize police
departments to contract with them.46 While databases previously only
provided rudimentary search capabilities, they have rapidly developed
over recent years.47 Today, several top databases, like Vigilant
Solutions, flaunt not only a large number of high-quality scans
produced by in-house scanners, but also several search and filter
categories with powerful analytics which provide various levels of data
and tracking services.48 Further, license plates can now be searched
against “hotlists” of plates compiled by law enforcement officials which
have been previously associated with crimes.49 To further incentivize
police departments to use their services, some private ALPR companies
rent or loan their advanced scanners to police departments.50 This has
allowed police departments with fewer resources to adopt this
technology.51 As offers like this spread, more and more officers across
the nation are able to view drivers’ location data at the click of a
button.52
The potential impact of this technology (both positive and
negative) cannot be understated. ALPR has been touted as a successful
crime-stopping tool in police departments nationwide.53 For example, in
March 2019, Atlanta police accepted an offer from ALPR startup, Flock
Safety, to install scanners in the Atlanta suburb, Zone 2, Beat 215.54
The suburb was one of the city’s most dangerous zones because of its
disproportionately high crime rate.55 Flock Safety provided the Atlanta
police with thirteen solar-powered ALPR scanners and granted them
readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations [https://perma.cc/9THJ-JVE8] (describing the
capabilities of ALPR scanners and databases).
45.
See id.
46.
See id.
47.
See id.
48.
See id.; see also Bring Us Your Cases, VIGILANT SOLS., http://www2.vigilantsolutions.com/bring-us-your-cases [https://perma.cc/3AQG-Y47L] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (providing
details of Vigilant Solutions database capabilities).
49.
See Jordan Steffen, License Plate Readers Help Police and Border Patrol, but Worry
Privacy Advocates, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-2010-dec-26-la-na-license-reader-20101226-story.html
[https://perma.cc/AE6X-PH43]
(explaining how “hot lists” function).
50.
See Matsakis, supra note 43 (describing Flock Safety services which include renting
ALPR scanners/cameras).
51.
See Simonite, supra note 10.
52.
See Matsakis, supra note 43.
53.
See id.
54.
See id.
55.
See id.
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full access to the Flock Safety database and accompanying analytic
features free of charge.56 The result was significant; Stuart VanHoozer,
the county’s deputy chief of police, said that six months after the ALPR
scanners were installed, the reported number of robberies and
nonresidential burglaries each dropped by 50 percent compared to the
previous year.57 Moreover, between March (when the scanners were
first installed) and August, the area also saw less than half the number
of “entering auto” crimes in comparison to the previous year.58 Although
VanHoozer declined to champion the Flock Safety scanners as the sole
reason for the change in crime rates, he acknowledged that the police
department saw “an incredible decrease in crime” after the ALPR
scanners were installed.59 Meanwhile, Flock Safety viewed the results
as a large victory; today, Flock Safety’s ALPR scanners are used in over
400 communities in thirty-five states.60 Meanwhile, academic studies
on the effect of ALPR have been largely inconclusive. While some have
found that the readers do not deter crime, others have found that
scanners specifically reduce certain types of crime or that the scanners
result in the apprehension of a repeat offender at a quicker rate, thus
reducing the prevalence of crime.61
Flock Safety is one of several private companies heavily invested
in ALPR technology.62 One of the most popular private databases that
is routinely used by police is known as Vigilant Solutions.63 Vigilant
Solutions sells access to its massive database of more than five billion
license plate scans collected across the country, accounting for over 1.5
billion reads to searches made by law enforcement agencies.64 The
database uses a global positioning system’s (GPS) coordinates of
wherever the vehicle queried was scanned or photographed to provide
the searcher with a range of addresses.65 While these databases boast
about their role in impacting crime statistics, a majority of license plate
scans are of innocent citizens’ cars that happen to drive by Vigilant
56.
See id.
57.
See id.
58.
See id.
59.
See id.
60.
See id.
61.
See id.
62.
See id.
63.
See id.
64.
See Vigilant Solutions, MOBILCOMM, https://www.mobilcomm.com/vigilant-solutions/
[https://perma.cc/ZR5X-NR3Q] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022); Vasudha Talla, Documents Reveal ICE
Using Driver Location Data from Local Police for Deportations, ACLU (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:00 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/documents-reveal-iceusing-driver-location-data [https://perma.cc/C925-Q8VS].
65.
See United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Solutions’ scanners.66 A study by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
highlighted this, reporting that of a sample size of 173 entities
consisting of police departments, federal agencies, and sheriffs’ offices
in twenty-three states from 2016 to 2017, 99.5 percent of the
approximately 2.5 billion license plates scanned belonged to cars whose
owners were not involved in any crimes.67 The impact of this technology
cannot be understated, and as of 2022, there are several pressing issues
regarding the police use of ALPR that must be addressed.
D. Pressing Issues with Police Use of ALPR in 2022
Recently, ALPR scanners have also produced dangerous
situations as a result of their inaccuracies.68 For example, in 2018,
Brian Hofer and his brother were on their way home when the Oakland
police pulled them over.69 The officers immediately drew their weapons
and ordered Hofer and his brother out of the car and onto their knees.70
With guns drawn, the arresting officers detained both Brian and his
brother.71 The police pulled over the Hofers because a Vigilant Solutions
ALPR scanner incorrectly flagged the Hofer’s vehicle as stolen and
pinged the police.72 The Hofer’s story is one of many that highlights the
extent to which US inhabitants are tracked and monitored across the
United States.73 Moreover, the Hofer’s experience also highlights a
heavy reliance that US police forces place on ALPR data when
conducting stops and arrests.74
The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center conducted
research on the accuracy of ALPR data, finding that a concerning
number of departments selected did not audit the accuracy of the data
at all.75 Of the data that could be found, it was estimated that the ALPR
66.
See Brooks, supra note 37, at 6, 17.
67.
See Tanvi Misra, Who’s Tracking Your License Plate?, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Dec. 6,
2018, 8:31 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-06/why-privacy-advocatesfear-license-plate-readers [https://perma.cc/QUD4-GRU8].
68.
See Charlie Warzel, When License-Plate Surveillance Goes Horribly Wrong, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/opinion/when-license-plate-surveillance-goes-horribly-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/4B57-47PS].
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
See id.
72.
Id.
73.
See id.
74.
See id.
75.
See Lisa Fernandez, Privacy Advocate Sues CoCo Sheriff’s Deputies After License Plate
Readers Target his Car Stolen, KTVU FOX 2 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ktvu.com/news/privacyadvocate-sues-coco-sheriffs-deputies-after-license-plate-readers-target-his-car-stolen
[https://perma.cc/C4HH-QAK4].
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scanners led to mistakes about 10 percent of the time.76 Despite this,
most police departments turn a blind eye and instead focus on the
positive effect ALPR usage has had on their ability to deter and prevent
crime.77
Further, critics of ALPR implementation have reported that this
technology is used in the United States to disproportionately surveil
people of color.78 For example, in 2015, police cars equipped with ALPR
scanners targeted minority communities in Oakland, intentionally
driving through lower-income areas to conduct multiple scans per day
and collect more extensive data from these neighborhoods.79 This data
was used to aggressively surveil members of those communities to
pretextually target them for potential offenses.80 Lawsuits emerged
against the same police departments after they granted the FBI
unauthorized access to their ALPR scans, in violation of Oakland
Privacy Advisory Commission policies.81
Presently, ALPR technology theoretically allows police
departments to determine exactly where all US inhabitants are at any
given time.82 Depending on how robustly it has been implemented, the
technology can develop detailed data about one’s daily routine, place of
work, and essentially all of one’s travels.83 Eighty-three percent of US
adults drive a car several times a week.84 These citizens are inevitably
scanned in their locality by ALPR.85 Data collected can be analyzed to
reveal not only a person’s trips to work or church, but also travel they
assumed would remain private, such as numerous visits to a bar or
doctor.86 Police departments of all sizes invest in ALPR; 93 percent of
76.
See Warzel, supra note 68.
77.
See id.
78.
See Annie Sciacca, Oakland Police Give FBI “Unfettered Access” to License Plate
Reader Data, According to Lawsuit, E. BAY TIMES (Sept. 7, 2021, 6:30 AM), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2021/09/04/oakland-police-give-fbi-unfettered-access-to-license-plate-reader-data-according-to-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/H4E5-TTVF].
79.
See id.
80.
See id.
81.
See id. (discussing how providing the FBI “unfettered access” to the license plate
data on the citizens of Oakland violated the city policy on sharing ALPR data outside the local
police department).
82.
See Zack Whittaker, Police License Plate Readers Are Still Exposed on the Internet,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 22, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/22/police-alpr-licenseplate-readers-accessible-internet/ [https://perma.cc/97K5-UKZQ].
83.
See Jamela Debelak, ALPR: The Surveillance Tool You’ve Probably Never Heard of,
ACLU WASH. (May 20, 2013), https://www.aclu-wa.org/blog/alpr-surveillance-tool-you-ve-probably-never-heard [https://perma.cc/N3X2-TLB9].
84.
Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
85.
See id.
86.
See id.
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police departments in cities with populations above one million use
ALPR, and 75 percent of police departments in cities with populations
above one hundred thousand have implemented these systems.87 These
statistics clearly suggest that the police departments have an interest
in the capabilities of ALPR technology.
Even though police departments in most states have
implemented ALPR technology, there has been limited regulation of
it.88 As of January 2022, only a handful of states have passed
ALPR-related regulations, and several others have considered and
specifically declined to do so.89 Of the states that have placed
restrictions on the use of this technology, many have opted to carve out
exceptions for common police functions.90 For example, under the Utah
Automatic License Plate Reader System Act, the use of ALPR is
generally prohibited.91 However, there are exceptions to the use of
ALPR by law enforcement, specifically when police: (1) use the
technology to protect public safety, (2) conduct criminal investigations,
(3) comply with the law, (4) enforce parking laws, (5) enforce motor
carrier laws, (6) collect a toll electronically, and (7) control access to a
secured area.92 Almost all activities undertaken by the police qualify for
these exceptions.
Further, policies regarding how long such data can be stored and
kept vary by state.93 According to a report from the American Civil
Liberties Union, the amount of times data is retained by a police
department varies widely.94 On the one hand, the Minnesota State
Patrol deletes the data it collects after forty-eight hours.95 On the other
hand, New Jersey police departments are required to hold the data for

87.
Id. (citing BRIAN A. REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: EQUIPMENT AND
TECHNOLOGY 4 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13et.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL8M69V4]).
88.
See AXON AI & POLICING TECH. ETHICS BD., supra note 10, at 11 (noting the lack of
regulation of ALPR technology in the United States despite its widespread implementation).
89.
See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-statutes-regulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-oralpr-data.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BBJ-RF8D]; Brooks, supra note 37, at 10.
90.
See AXON AI & POLICING TECH. ETHICS BD., supra note 10, at 30.
91.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2003(1) (West 2022).
92.
See § 41-6a-2003(2).
93.
See You Are Being Tracked, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/you-are-being-tracked [https://perma.cc/6V6F-K4TR] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
94.
See ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE
BEING USED TO RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 18, 20 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/GNC5-2WN9].
95.
See id. at 20.
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over five years.96 Additionally, some police agencies are allowed to use
the information to assist and aid with criminal investigations
nationally, while others are not.97 The lack of uniform regulation of this
technology is especially concerning because most police departments
use ALPR.98 State policies appear concerningly outdated and
inadequate when considering how contemporary ALPR technology
functions.
Despite the disparity in how the technology is regulated among
the states, Congress has repeatedly refused to step in and regulate.99
Congress’s refusal is partly because any attempts at federal regulation
have been met with fierce opposition by police lobbying groups.100 Most
notably, in 2015, the International Association of Chiefs of Police sent
a peremptory letter to stop federal lawmakers, warning Congress of the
adverse effects of future ALPR restrictions.101 The letter vehemently
stated the benefits of ALPR technology and expressed concerns over
classifying ALPR as a national real-time tracking capability for law
enforcement.102 On the other hand, citizens have advocated for national
regulation because of serious privacy concerns.103
Notwithstanding concerns that ALPR allows police departments
to track US citizens, both Congress and the federal courts have largely
avoided addressing the constitutionality of ALPR use.

96.
See id.
97.
See id. at 25–27.
98.
See id. at 12, 20.
99.
See Brooks, supra note 37, at 19.
100.
See Cyrus Farivar, Cops Are Freaked Out that Congress May Impose License Plate
Reader Limits, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/cops-are-freaked-out-that-congress-may-impose-license-plate-reader-limits/
[https://perma.cc/Z4AV-3FXY].
101.
See id. (“[The International Association of Chiefs of Police is] deeply concerned about
efforts to portray automated license plate recognition (ALPR) technology as a national real-time
tracking capability for law enforcement. The fact is that this technology and the data it
generates is not used to track people in real time. ALPR is used every day to generate
investigative leads that help law enforcement solve murders, rapes, and serial property crimes,
recover abducted children, detect drug and human trafficking rings, find stolen vehicles,
apprehend violent criminal alien fugitives, and support terrorism investigations.”).
102.
See id.
103.
See id. (“Mike Katz-Lacabe, a privacy activist in San Leandro, California, who
famously shared photos that his city’s police had taken of him and his daughters exiting their own
car on their own driveway voiced his concerns against the technology. ‘While it is technically correct that license plate readers do not track people in real time, it does track vehicles,’ he wrote.
‘Most of the time, that means you are tracking the person to whom the car is registered. It’s the
equivalent of stating that the stingray isn’t used to track people, it’s used to track a
specific phone.’”).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WITH THE POLICE USE OF ALPR
Over the years, several cases have examined the
constitutionality of the police’s use of advanced technologies like
ALPR.104 As of the publication of this Note, though, the Supreme Court
has not required police officers to obtain a warrant to photograph
license plates to compare against law enforcement databases.105
Further, the Court has not required officers to meet a specific
evidentiary standard to justify using this technology in the first place;106
there are two reasons for this. First, due to the pervasive regulation of
vehicles that travel on public highways, there is no expectation of
privacy in the context of license plates.107 Second, longstanding
precedent holds that drivers on public roads cannot expect their
movements to be kept private from the police.108
Over the years, as technological inventions were acknowledged
as potential threats to individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights, the
Court began to recognize how “innovations in surveillance tools” can
infringe one’s right to privacy.109 Most notably, in Kyllo v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that police need a warrant to use thermal
imaging to detect heat coming from a garage that would not be visible
to a human eye to detect a marijuana production operation.110 Although
academics argue that certain First Amendment issues arise out of using
ALPR,111 this Note focuses on the Fourth Amendment issues posed by
this technology.
A. Relevant Cases Addressed by the Supreme Court
The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects Americans from
unreasonable searches and seizures.112 The Supreme Court has
expounded upon the text of the Fourth Amendment, positing that the
purpose of the Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.”113

104.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
35–36 (2001).
105.
See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662.
106.
See id. at 654–55.
107.
See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
108.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
109.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2208 (2018); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
110.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
111.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
112.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
113.
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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A seminal case concerning the constitutionality of technology
analogous to ALPR is United States v. Jones.114 Although the case does
not discuss ALPR technology, the Court considers a comparable level of
intrusion by GPS technology.115 In Jones, the police placed a GPS
tracker on an individual’s vehicle and then used the device to track that
vehicle’s movements on public streets.116 The majority found that the
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, but not necessarily because of
the information collected by the GPS tracker.117 Instead, the Court held
that the installation and monitoring of a GPS device without a warrant
on an individual’s vehicle was a trespassory search under common
law.118 The Court’s approach has been coined the “trespass-based”
rule.119 The Court has historically held that where there is a physical
trespass and intrusion, it likely triggers Fourth Amendment
protection.120 Regarding the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court
concluded: “It may be that achieving the same result through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer
that question.”121 The Court refused to answer this question due to
concerns over additional “thorny problems” that it wished to avoid at
the time.122
In concurrence with the Jones majority, Justice Sotomayor
addressed the issue of a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s
public movements.123 On the issue of an expectation of privacy to an
aggregation of data of one’s travels, Justice Sotomayor specifically notes
that “[i]n cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that
do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority
opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.”124 Justice
Sotomayor highlighted the majority’s refusal to address whether
aggregation of one’s public travel and movements impedes an
individual’s constitutional rights.125 Such an answer would eliminate
the constitutional limbo in which police use of ALPR resides.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012).
See id.
See id. at 402.
See id. at 413.
See id. at 409–11.
See id. at 421 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See id. at 409–11 (majority opinion).
Id. at 412.
See id.
See id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 415.
See id.
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Justice Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined the Jones
concurrence, which urged the Court to consider this subject.126
Specifically, Justice Alito encouraged the Court to focus on whether
society is willing to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
long-term monitoring of an individual’s vehicle, rather than whether
the government’s installation of the GPS tracker constitutes a
warrantless search.127 The Justices criticized the majority for focusing
on the trespass issue that “may have provided grounds in 1791 for a
suit for trespass to chattels” rather than the actual privacy issue at
hand—long-term monitoring of one’s movements.128 In the concurrence,
the Justices highlighted the issues with a “trespass-based rule.”129 This
rule establishes that when there is a “technical trespass” followed by
evidence gathering, the Court will find the conduct to constitute a
search, whereas, in circumstances without such a trespass, the Court
finds that no search occurred.130 The concurrence argued that the
majority should have implemented the Katz test,131 which places
emphasis on whether a societal expectation of privacy was breached,
instead of a trespass-based test, which focuses on whether a trespass
occurred.132
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified that the
Fourth Amendment protects “people[,] not places,” and established that
Fourth Amendment protections apply when an individual has a
subjective expectation of privacy which society finds objectively
reasonable.133 This test, however, did not replace the trespass-based
test, which, as noted, has continued to be applied in subsequent cases.134
Additionally, in Jones, the Supreme Court explicitly held that this
reasonable expectation does not translate to publicly viewable
information, like travel on public roadways, and the Court has never

126.
See id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
127.
See id. at 418–19 (“Ironically, the Court has chosen to decide this case based on
18th-century tort law.”).
128.
See id.
129.
See id. at 421–22 (explaining cases that highlighted caveats of the trespass rule).
130.
See id. at 420–21.
131.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
132.
See id.; Jones, 565 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[Katz] finally did away with the
old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a Fourth Amendment violation.”).
133.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
134.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409–11 (“But as we have discussed, the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.”).
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held that aggregation of this information warrants constitutional
protection.135
This gap between the lack of an expectation of privacy during
travel on public roads in light of the acknowledged potential expectation
of privacy on the aggregation of certain types of data on citizens is
important because the Katz approach,136 to implicate Fourth
Amendment protections which limit the power of police to surveil
citizens, moves the focus of the analysis from technical trespass,
towards societal expectation of privacy. The Katz test,137 however, has
its own caveats. First, the test itself does not replace the trespass-based
test despite being starkly different from the earlier trespass-based test.
As a result, there is variety in the way in which courts across the nation
address ALPR in the first place.
Moreover, the Katz test is also cumbersome to apply because it
requires judges to consider a hypothetical reasonable person when
evaluating a reasonable expectation of privacy.138 This approach forces
judges to consider both their own personal expectations of privacy and
that of a hypothetical reasonable person in society, resulting in
inconsistent rulings dependent on a specific judge’s understanding of a
cutting-edge technology.139 Despite these issues, the concurrence held
that while relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on
public streets may be permissible, the government’s tracking of the
suspect for four weeks likely crossed the line.140 This discussion is the
closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the aggregation of data of one’s
movements.141 Answering this question of whether ALPR technology
potentially uses an aggregation of data of one’s movements exceeding a
societal expectation to privacy is key to determining the
constitutionality of ALPR technology.
Another relevant Supreme Court case analyzing police use of
twenty-first-century technology under the Fourth Amendment is
Carpenter v. United States.142 In that case, the defendant argued that
the police’s use of his historical cell phone data—specifically, his

135.
See id. at 420, 424 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting the disharmony in the courts
applying Katz).
136.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
137.
Id.
138.
Id.; see Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
139.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
140.
See id. at 430.
141.
See id.
142.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2208–09 (2018).
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location—violated the Fourth Amendment.143 The Court found that
such information, especially when viewed in the aggregate, allowed the
police to track a person’s routine and daily life.144 These concerns,
combined with the “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” of this
data, as well as the “inescapable and automatic nature of its collection,”
implicated constitutional protections.145 The Court in Carpenter alluded
to several concerns raised today by citizens concerned about the lack of
regulation on the police’s ability to use ALPR technology, including
concerns about the automatic nature of the data’s collection and how
driving—while voluntary—is necessary for a citizen to adequately
participate in society.146
B. Relevant Cases Addressed by Lower Courts
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed how the police
use of ALPR technology fares under the Fourth Amendment, lower
courts have addressed this specific issue.
There are several recent cases which concern the
constitutionality of unwarranted police use of ALPR databases. For
instance, in May 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Yang decided a case where the defendant
challenged an ALPR database search under the Fourth Amendment.147
In Yang, the police used ALPR technology to search through the
Vigilant Solutions’ database for the license plate of the defendant’s
vehicle to ascertain its location.148 Vigilant Solutions provided the police
with a timed scan of the defendant’s vehicle and an address leading to
the defendant’s private gated residence.149 After he was detained, the
defendant argued that the ALPR technology used to track and locate
him without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.150

143.
See id. at 2212.
144.
See id. at 2220.
145.
See id. (“In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to participation in
modern society.”).
146.
See id. at 2218.
147.
United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2020).
148.
See id.; see also MOTOROLA SOLS., DO MORE THAN JUST DETECT (2021),
https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/video-security-access-control/license-plate-recognitioncamera-systems.html?utm_source=vigilantsolutions.com&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=vigilantsolutions_redirect [https://perma.cc/7FJM-L2TY] (click “Download the Brochure”) (overviewing the capabilities of Vigilant Solutions’ ALPR technology).
149.
See Yang, 958 F.3d at 853.
150.
See id.
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The majority’s opinion highlights the difficulty posed by the
ambiguous constitutionality of ALPR technology. Here, the court
reasoned that, under Katz,151 there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy because Yang drove a rental car that was due back to a rental
car company hours before the ALPR scanner located the vehicle at his
residence.152 Like the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit avoided
addressing the constitutional implications of police use of ALPR
technology. Instead, the court found that the rental car contract stated
that the vehicle would be reported stolen if not returned by a specific
time.153 Accordingly, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the vehicle’s location.154
Judge Bea’s concurrence approached the issue differently.155
Rather than focusing on whether the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy at the time, Judge Bea focused on the fact that
only one ALPR scan was used to locate the defendant’s vehicle.156 This
fact is important because Judge Bea highlighted how in this case, ALPR
did not reveal an aggregation of the defendant’s movements but rather
a single location.157 Judge Bea further opined that a single scan could
not reasonably violate one’s expectation of privacy, and hence no Fourth
Amendment question was implicated.158 This argument raises an
interesting concern—ALPR technology functions off one or more scans:
At what point does aggregation of these scans violate a societally
recognized expectation of privacy? As of now, no court has answered
this question.
As evidenced by current case law, the legality of police using
ALPR technology is in limbo. Both Supreme Court and lower court
rulings have failed to directly address ALPR technology and whether
aggregation of one’s public travels implicates Fourth Amendment
rights. This Note next analyzes existing case law and suggests that
judicial action clarifies the constitutionality of ALPR usage by the
police.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See Yang, 958 F.3d at 861.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 862–63 (Bea, J., concurring).
See id.
See id. at 863.
See id. at 862.
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III. THE CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS POSED BY ALPR ARE INADEQUATE
The current methods used to address the privacy implications
posed by ALPR technology are inadequate. Under the Supreme Court’s
current doctrine, police use of ALPR in most situations does not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.159 However, as more
and more cases arise in the lower courts, the Court must eventually
address this issue in more depth. The ALPR industry is rapidly
growing.160 As a greater number of police departments and companies
invest in this technology, there is an increasing need for new judicial
guidance. Specifically, courts must address whether police use of
modern cutting-edge ALPR scanners and databases amounts to a
constitutional “search.”161
A. The Current Approach to Defining a Search Inadequately Addresses
ALPR Technology
The Court’s definition of a search under the Fourth Amendment
is far from clear.162 The Supreme Court first analyzed the
constitutionality of certain police surveillance technologies in Olmstead
v. United States.163 In Olmstead, the trial court convicted the
defendants for a conspiracy to sell illegal liquor in violation of the
National Prohibition Act.164 The conspiracy was discovered, however,
because federal prohibition officers were spying on the defendants via
wiretap, intercepting and recording months’ worth of incriminating
communications.165 Notably, the officers tapped the wires “along the
ordinary telephone wires” to ensure that there was no physical trespass
on the defendants’ properties.166 As a result, the court that applied the
trespass-based test found that there was no search because wiretapping
public phone lines is distinct from a “real” physical intrusion.167
159.
See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 309–12 (2011).
160.
See Yang, 958 F.3d at 853.
161.
See id. at 853–54.
162.
See Bradford P. Wilson, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: A Jurisprudential
History, 28 CATH. LAW. 174, 174–75 (1986).
163.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
164.
See id. at 455.
165.
See id. at 456–57.
166.
See id. This was specifically done by the police to avoid concerns with the
“trespass-based” test which placed a great emphasis on a physical trespass to constitute a search.
See id.
167.
See id. at 466.
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Further, the court noted that tapping public phone lines on public
property between the defendant’s home was comparable to a police
search on public property, like highways.168 This holding confirms that
the trespass-based test would not find police use of ALPR technology
constitutes a search.169
On the other hand, the later-promulgated Katz test focuses on
an individual’s subjective privacy expectation in light of society’s
objective opinion of the reasonableness of that privacy expectation and
the relative intrusiveness of the supposed privacy intrusion.170 The
Supreme Court has also drawn a sharp distinction between
(a) primarily constitutional technology that improves the efficiency of
legitimate policing, like certain digital tracking devices, and
(b) unconstitutional technologies such as those in Kyllo, which give
police an intrusive “extrasensory ability.”171 However, this framework
gives a lot of deference to police departments that use various forms of
modern technology, including ALPR.172 Under this approach, the use of
ALPR technology by police without a warrant likely fits comfortably
under current constitutional doctrine.173 This precedent highlights that
a person does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
when driving on public roads, which is precisely what ALPR captures.174
Further, under this framework, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Garcia found that recording a
person’s movements in public is not especially intrusive, even when law
enforcement uses advanced GPS surveillance to do so.175 In the opinion,
Judge Posner foreshadowed the dilemma posed by ALPR: “Should
government someday decide to institute a program of mass surveillance
of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the
Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as
a search.”176
The rapid advancement and widespread implementation of
ALPR technology is strikingly similar to Judge Posner’s “program of

168.
See id. at 465 (“The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more
than are the highways along which they are stretched.”).
169.
See id.
170.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
171.
See Rushin, supra note 159, at 305–09.
172.
See id.
173.
See id. at 309–12 (explaining that under both the Katz test and trespass-based test
various forms of technology including ALPR are likely permissible).
174.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
175.
See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
176.
Id. at 998.
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mass surveillance of vehicular movements.”177 Today, ALPR scanners
can survey millions of vehicles every second and record and collect data
on vehicular movements through public and private databases,
primarily for government use.178 The unregulated use of this technology
has led to racial profiling, pretextual searches, and overall stress on
society’s traditional expectations of privacy.179 Despite this, the
judiciary’s applications of the Katz or trespass-based tests ultimately
find that ALPR technology rarely constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search.180
B. Current ALPR Usage Remains Unconstrained by Katz
As a result of the doubt cast by the Supreme Court as to whether
a citizen has a subjectively or objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy when traveling on public roads, ALPR does not constitute a
search under current doctrine.181 The Court has traditionally held that
people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in public places, such
as public roads and highways, because activities conducted in such
places are easily viewable and visible to the public; thus, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in those activities.182 Considering this
in light of the first part of the Katz test, it is unlikely that a court will
find that citizens’ privacy rights are violated when traveling on public
roads.183 Applying Katz, courts focus on whether the citizen exhibited a
desire for or an expectation of privacy recognized by society.184
The second prong of the Katz test concerns whether or not the
suspect’s expectation of privacy would be recognized as objectively
reasonable.185 Historically, this prong is given greater significance than
the first.186 Although the definition of objectively reasonable is not
specified in constitutional doctrine, there is a broader set of factors on
how the Court determines this standard to give a narrower sense of
what objectively reasonable entails.187 In light of police activity, the
177.
See id.
178.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
179.
See Sciacca, supra note 78.
180.
See Rushin, supra note 159, at 309–313.
181.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
182.
See id.
183.
See id.
184.
See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1983).
185.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
186.
See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525.
187.
See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1254–58 (D. Haw. 1976)
(detailing the courts process in determining whether a new technology—telescopic
photography—implicates a constitutional protection).
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most important factors are: (1) whether the observation was made in
plain sight, (2) the relative intrusiveness of the tactic, and (3) whether
the police activity would have been offensive to the Framers of the
Constitution.188 In the context of ALPR, there is little question as to
whether the observation could be made in plain sight because license
plates are easily visible to passing bystanders. However, there is a
significant level of intrusion when considering the relative invasiveness
of ALPR technology, specifically the covert nature and the magnitude
of information collected by ALPR technology.189 The Court and
academics state that this is likely outweighed by the fact that
communities often elect to install ALPR scanners in their
neighborhoods and contract with databases voluntarily.190 This
voluntary conduct indicates a value judgment made by the people
within the areas subject to ALPR technology—specifically, that the
value of this technology is greater than any potential privacy
concerns.191 The issue with such a conclusion is the lack of community
participation in such decisions.192 Several police departments choose to
initially embrace this technology without community input, making the
decision largely within the police department rather than within the
community.193
Next, regarding whether the use of the technology would be
conduct that the Framers would find offensive, an argument can be
made that ALPR technology exceeds the bounds of anything the
Framers could have conceived. Accordingly, attempting to consider
whether the Framers would find the use of such technology “offensive”
is unrealistic. Additionally, the difficulty in conceiving how the Framers
would interpret cutting-edge technology only complicates matters.194
Ultimately, it is up to the Supreme Court to determine what would
offend the Framers. While judges cannot truly know what the Framers
would consider offensive, they have construed that there is no
legitimate, objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s
188.
See Rushin, supra note 159, at 310–11.
189.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44 (highlighting the magnitude of data
collection of modern-day ALPR technology).
190.
See Matsakis, supra note 43 (detailing how local officials and the police department
choose to implement ALPR technology towards community safety interests); Rushin, supra note
159, at 315–16.
191.
See Matsakis, supra note 43; Rushin, supra note 159, at 311.
192.
See AXON AI & POLICING TECH. ETHICS BD., supra note 10, at 29 (discussing the
importance of involving communities before law enforcement agencies adopt ALPR technology).
193.
See Matsakis, supra note 43; Simonite, supra note 10.
194.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 567–76 (2017) (discussing how the Court has grappled with new and changing
technologies for Fourth Amendment purposes).
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activities on public roads, indicating the Court’s belief that the Framers
would not find ALPR technology offensive.195
In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court concluded that
“[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”196 The Court specifically noted that when traveling down a
public street, one voluntarily conveys to the public that he or she is
traveling on a certain road, in a certain direction.197 Further, the Court
stated that by simply driving on a public road, a person knowingly
conveys certain information to the public.198 This information includes
their general route, stops made during their travels, and even their
final destination.199 This holding suggests that if the Court were to
consider the facts of Yang, it would hold that the defendant, by driving
on public roads, was voluntarily conveying to all not only his current
location but also the defendant’s final destination, including the
location of his private residence.200
Thus, considering the Katz test as it stands,201 the Court would
likely find that the police use of ALPR technology does not infringe on
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.202
C. ALPR Technology Gives Law Enforcement a Significant
Extrasensory Ability
In Kyllo, the Court placed great emphasis on the reality of law
enforcement’s sense-enhancing ability to intrude on one’s privacy by
using modern technology.203 While ALPR technology does not
necessarily give law enforcement an ability to intrude into the
boundaries of the home, it does, in a way, give them extrasensory
ability. That capacity, of course, is ALPR technologies capability of
monitoring and tracking vehicles, unlike traditional police work.204
While police may be able to follow a car or write down a plate number,
195.
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); see also
Rushin, supra note 159 (explaining that, under the Supreme Court’s precedents, ALPR does not
appear to violate the Fourth Amendment).
196.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
197.
Id. at 281–82.
198.
See id.
199.
See id. (highlighting how a “final destination” can include exiting a public road onto
private property).
200.
See id.; United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d, 851, 854–57 (9th Cir. 2020).
201.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
202.
See Rushin, supra note 159.
203.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).
204.
See Rushin, supra note 159, at 285–86.
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such manual work is simply incomparable to how modern-day ALPR
technology functions. Although the Court has placed great emphasis on
the protection of an individual’s home, there is merit in considering the
strong extrasensory ability that modern-day ALPR technology gives to
police, despite being used in the context of public roads.205 Modern
ALPR technology across the nation captures millions of license
plates.206 It can be used to track a vehicle and its driver across state
lines and over days without any actual police officers physically
acting.207 Police use of ALPR, similar to the heat scanners in Kyllo,208
very likely constitutes an extrasensory ability.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that technologies which substantially improve an officer’s senses are
constitutional.209 There, the technology at issue was aerial
photography, the use of which was without a warrant.210 Although the
aerial photography was detailed, it simply gave police the ability to get
a bird’s-eye view of a property.211 Meanwhile, the officers still had to fly
a plane with a camera mounted to it, and analyze the results.212
This technology is vastly different than ALPR technology, which
is essentially always operating without any police interaction.213 Other
than the initial setup of sensors on vehicles or fixed areas, the sensors
largely function without the aid of a police officer.214 ALPR scanners
capture potentially thousands of vehicles per second, and this data is
automatically sent to ALPR databases that then compile and process
it.215 Although precedent suggests that it is not unconstitutional for
police to use technology that substantially improves their sensory
abilities, ALPR may have crossed the line into extrasensory.216 It seems
unlikely the Framers intended for the police to have unrestrained
ability to implement invasive technologies on the premise that the
technology does not infringe on the privacy of a home. There must be a

205.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
206.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
207.
See Rushin, supra note 159, at 285–86.
208.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
209.
See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
210.
See id. at 229.
211.
See id. at 238.
212.
See id. at 229.
213.
See Rushin, supra note 159, at 285–86.
214.
See id.
215.
See id.
216.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (discussing how the
aggregation of data can present constitutional concerns). But see Rushin, supra note 159, at
309–13 (discussing how ALPR is likely constitutional under current doctrine).
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line when it comes to police implementing technology to monitor citizen
conduct, even if it occurs outside of the bounds of the home.
D. ALPR Databases Should Implicate Fourth Amendment Protections
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that warrantless access to
pen registers (recording devices) used for telephone wiretaps does not
raise Fourth Amendment concerns because a person should understand
that their phone company keeps call records.217 Therefore, because one
knowingly and voluntarily turns over this information to the phone
company, it is reasonable to expect the company to convey this
information to others.218 Consequently, telephone users do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their telephone records,
notwithstanding the breadth of the information collected by the phone
company.219 This greatly differs from ALPR technology because drivers
do not necessarily know of or understand the databases that compile
and process ALPR data.220 Rather, while drivers may understand that
the details of their travels are conveyed to other citizens and police
whom they drive past, they likely do not understand that they are
knowingly conveying their license plate and location to several discrete
ALPR scanners throughout their daily commute. ALPR technology
concerns a part of life that many Americans simply cannot give up; a
concept best illustrated in Carpenter—the use of a car is indispensable
to the average citizen.221 When someone drives their car, they do not
consent to the use of ALPR technology; rather, it is used regardless of
them giving their permission or not.
In Smith, the Court recognized the threat to privacy imposed by
the accumulation of personal information.222 The Court noted how
collecting a single piece of data may not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, but that the aggregation of such data could.223 This
directly relates to ALPR technology—while a single scan of a license
plate likely does not implicate constitutional protections, at some point,

217.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–46 (1979).
218.
See id. at 742–44.
219.
See id.
220.
See Brooks, supra note 37, at 1–3.
221.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (discussing how cell phones and the services they
provide are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that using one is essentially
indispensable for participation in American society).
222.
See id. at 2223.
223.
See id.; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (noting the potential threat
to privacy created by data accumulation and the mitigating role statutes, regulations, and the
Constitution can play to address that threat).
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the aggregation of numerous scans may.224 Although the Court did not
clarify at what point this threat implicates constitutional protections,225
ALPR technology certainly appears to meet or exceed that threshold.
These expansive databases not only store millions of scans generated
each day, but also provide complex metrics such as live tracking and
locational services.226 Although the Court highlighted that every time a
person gets in an automobile, one assumes the risk that law
enforcement may document their movements,227 this does not
necessarily mean that one consents to being tracked by private ALPR
database companies.
In short, the current approaches to address whether police use
of advanced technologies implicates the Fourth Amendment are
inadequate. Under the Katz test, courts cannot consistently address the
concerns regarding police use of ALPR technology.228 Additionally,
under the older trespass-based test, courts cannot effectively analyze
modern technologies like ALPR because it does not have a physical
presence which constitutes a physical trespass.229 However, by focusing
on certain elements that have been recognized by the Court as
significant (such as extrasensory ability),230 it is conceivable to see how
the use of this technology may implicate constitutional protections. All
in all, the current approaches to addressing whether new technology
implicates Fourth Amendment protections are outdated and in need of
reform.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR BETTER REGULATING ALPR TECHNOLOGY
ALPR highlights the need for a legal shift in addressing the
privacy implications of cutting-edge technology. Under the various
current approaches, police departments can implement pervasive forms
of surveillance in public areas and roads with disquieting ease.231 There
must be a transition in the judiciary’s approaches that focuses not only
on the capture or creation of a single piece of ALPR data, but also on
the aggregation of these data points in databases. Although ALPR data

224.
See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
225.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
226.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44; see also Bring Us Your Cases, supra
note 48 (describing the features and services of Vigilant’s ALPR databases).
227.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983).
228.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
229.
See id. at 353 (majority opinion).
230.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001).
231.
See Warzel, supra note 68 (explaining how an ALPR database automatically
prompted a dangerous police response without any supporting information).
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captures something that a driver knowingly exposes to the public, the
driver is not necessarily aware that the information is being
aggregated, compiled, and analyzed. As a result, courts and lawmakers
should limit ALPR in four ways. First, courts should rule that while
ALPR technology itself is not necessarily unconstitutional, a search
takes place when the information gathered from the aggregation of
several “scans” exceeds what realistically could be achieved by physical
police work. Second, the courts should rule that, in order to use ALPR
in the first place, police forces must be able to demonstrate that an
individual’s actions satisfy the reasonable suspicion evidentiary
standard. A lower evidentiary standard than probable cause,
reasonable suspicion requires only that law enforcement demonstrate a
particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing based on “specific and
articulable facts” in conjunction with “rational inferences.”232 Imposing
a minimum standard requirement on police access to ALPR data is
necessary to reform the way police use this pervasive technology. Third,
lawmakers should propose federal legislation which limits the amount
of time ALPR scans and data can be retained. This legislation will
better regulate ALPR technology and eliminate the different
approaches followed by individual states. Finally, the government
should create an agency to set standards, audit, and monitor the
increasing number of private ALPR databases.
A. The Courts Should Implement a New Standard That Better
Addresses When Cutting-Edge Technology Such as ALPR Can Be Used
by Law Enforcement
The courts—especially the Supreme Court—are best positioned
to address certain problems posed by ALPR. As of this Note’s
publication, all major privacy implications regarding pervasive
technology and policing are primarily addressed by the courts.233 ALPR
poses great privacy implications, and the inadequacy of the courts’
current approaches to ALPR and similar technologies warrants reform.
The courts should not ban ALPR technology outright, but they should
instead limit its use by police depending on the type of information

232.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Rushin, supra note 159, at 318
(explaining the evidentiary standard of “reasonable suspicion”).
233.
See Kade Crockford & Nathan Freed Wessler, The Supreme Court’s Big Privacy
Ruling Sent a Message. Will Judges Hear It?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/supreme-courts-big-privacy-ruling-sent-message-will-judges
[https://perma.cc/QU2U-3KUK] (last visited Dec. 26, 2021) (highlighting the Supreme Court’s
power in dictating privacy protections for citizens from law enforcement).
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being generated. To do so, the Court should implement a new standard
to govern when and to what extent police can use ALPR.
The first and second proposals are important because they tie
modern technologies, like ALPR, back to the physical ability of US
police forces. This was a concept addressed by the Court in Kyllo, which
found that police use of heat-ray technology to support the discovery of
a marijuana plant operation was unconstitutional.234 That holding was
partially fueled by the fact that the heat rays in question were not
actually physically visible to law enforcement on the scene.235 As a
result, the Court found that this sense-enhancing ability, in
combination with the intrusion of one’s home, warranted Fourth
Amendment protections.236 Similarly, the courts should find that if
police evidence is generated by excessive and pervasive ALPR scans
over an extended period of time, a search warrant should be required to
access the information in question. Such an approach will drastically
shift the way that current ALPR databases function.
These databases may have to change the way they operate, for
example, by first notifying officers of the number of scans taken before
allowing access to certain data. Alternatively, databases may instead
display only the most recent scans before warning officers that
accessing information over a longer period of time may constitute a
search. This proposal follows the line of reasoning that the concurrence
in Jones highlighted when they found that long-term civilian tracking
constitutes a search in certain circumstances.237 By warning officers
that the use of certain features or live tracking capabilities may require
a warrant, ALPR will be limited as a tool and can better reflect the
physical capabilities of law enforcement. If the information sought is
generated by a large aggregation of scans over an extended period,
officers should instead pursue a search warrant to ensure that they are
operating within the bounds of the Constitution.
This proposal also alludes to the privacy concerns mentioned in
Carpenter regarding aggregating data.238 Data that is by itself
permissible when aggregated can be problematic and implicate
constitutional protections. While calculating what law enforcement is
physically capable of accomplishing will be difficult, this judicial
234.
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
235.
See id.
236.
See id.
237.
It is important to note that the five justices in the majority opinion in Jones did not
specifically find that long term tracking constitutes a search. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 424–25 (2012). While the justices considered that question, they stated that answering it
would lead to “additional thorny problems” which they choose to avoid. See id. at 412.
238.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
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approach will acknowledge that although police can employ
cutting-edge technologies, they cannot circumvent constitutional
protections. Further, as courts persistently implement this approach,
the burden will be reduced as case law creates a clear precedent for
courts to rely on in future decisions.
ALPR technology, at its core, functions as a two-part system.
Data is first collected by scanning a vehicle traversing public roads or
property, which is then compiled, analyzed, and processed through
several complex and increasingly privatized databases.239 As noted,
there is little expectation of privacy when a single piece of ALPR data
is scanned and collected because license plate numbers and locations
can be observed at a certain point in time.240 This is publicly viewable
and not recognized as private information.241 The concerns thus arise in
the second part of this process, the aggregation of this data. These
databases compile those single pieces of publicly viewable license plate
information such as timestamps and vehicle make.242 This data is then
aggregated and manipulated to generate certain metrics depending on
the number of scans within ALPR databases.243 Such a system poses
serious concerns because data generated by ALPR databases is treated
equally regardless of whether it is produced by one scan or several scans
over an extended period of time.244
Currently, some jurisdictions require that scans be deleted from
all databases after a certain amount of time.245 However, other
jurisdictions do not place any limits on ALPR scan retention.246
Considering that these databases and their content are available across
state lines,247 it is plausible that some scans are never completely
deleted regardless of local policy. Therefore, it is important to place
limits on this information’s accessibility.
As it stands, ALPR technology potentially allows a police officer
to survey and track citizens for any reason, whether it be pretextual
239.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
240.
See id.
241.
See id.
242.
See id.
243.
See id.
244.
See id.
245.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2022); see also Dave Maas &
Hayley Tsukayama, EFF Joins Effort to Restrict Automated License Plate Readers in California,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/01/eff-joins-effort-restrict-automated-license-plate-readers-california [https://perma.cc/QM6H-NX44] (discussing the
push in California and other states for quick deletion of ALPR data from databases).
246.
See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, supra note 89 (listing the only
sixteen states that have enacted ALPR limitations).
247.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
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(i.e., racial profiling) or genuine police work. To resolve this, courts
should require that police officers (a) meet the evidentiary standard of
reasonable suspicion to access single scans of ALPR data stored in a
database, or (b) seek a warrant to access several scans of ALPR data
compiled to provide locational and tracking services.
This proposal is important for several reasons. First, it
immediately prevents this technology from being used in a racially
motivated manner. As mentioned, ALPR technology has been
disproportionately used in lower-income areas to target certain
minority groups.248 By requiring police officers to at least satisfy the
reasonable suspicion standard before accessing the information stored
in these databases, ALPR technology use in racially motivated ways
will be significantly diminished. Further, by requiring that police
officers obtain a warrant prior to receiving full access to tracking
features and data compilations, officers will have to rely on traditional
policing methods in addition to ALPR technology. This proposal will
thus limit ALPR technology as a tool to fight specific crimes rather than
allow it to operate as a generalized, expansive addition to US police
surveillance capabilities.
This approach is in line with action taken by New Hampshire
and Maine legislatures, both of which have implemented policies that
require officers to have reasonable suspicion of a crime before using
ALPR data to justify stopping an individual.249 This limitation is
important because it protects citizens from being subjected to police
interactions solely based on ALPR data; it also requires that officers
continue to depend on traditional law enforcement methods rather than
information from private companies. By establishing an appropriate
evidentiary standard, ALPR technology will remain a police tool rather
than a crutch.
B. New Federal Legislation Should Be Enacted to Limit the Amount of
Time ALPR Data Can Be Retained
There are also significant concerns over the lack of cohesion
regarding the aggregation and retention of ALPR data, specifically due
to the inconsistent state-by-state basis for standards regarding how
long ALPR data can be stored and searched for.250 This issue is twopronged and can be adequately addressed by new legislation.
248.
See Sciacca, supra note 78.
249.
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2022); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A
(2022).
250.
See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, supra note 89 (listing the
varying laws of the only 16 states that have enacted ALPR limitations).
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The way that ALPR data is currently retained depends on the
state in which the police department resides: some states permit no
data retention, some only permit retention on a specific criminal basis,
and others permit retention for essentially an unlimited length of
time.251 This framework is problematic because state lines do not bind
ALPR databases that collect this information.252 Thus, to effectively
limit this technology, there must be federal legislation which bars
retaining information after a specified amount of time. Accordingly,
lawmakers should pass federal legislation which bars retaining and
storing ALPR scans gathered more than ten days prior, unless the data
is flagged on a police hotlist. In the event the data is flagged on a hotlist
because it is related to an active crime, it should be stored for a
maximum of thirty days. An exception to this thirty-day requirement
should be approved by a court on a case-by-case basis if law enforcement
can demonstrate a compelling reason for an extension. Upon such a
showing, it should be in the court’s discretion to award additional time
for data retention.
This restriction is vital to prevent ALPR technology from
turning into a form of widespread police surveillance. Limiting the
retention period of this data also ties ALPR scans closer to the realm of
what is physically observable. Rather than giving officers the ability,
especially in hindsight, to look at citizens’ data collected months or even
years ago, this policy would limit the amount of data aggregated and
used in ALPR searches. Further, such a system balances the societal
expectation of privacy with ALPR’s crime-fighting capabilities.
Such a proposal is consistent with some states’ current
limitations on police surveillance technologies.253 Maine, California,
and New Hampshire have limited law enforcement surveillance,
specifically ALPR, in several ways.254 Maine has explicitly regulated
ALPR technology by limiting how long police departments can retain
scans to twenty-one days; it has also passed other reforms regarding
confidentiality of the stored data.255 In New Hampshire, the law limits
all surveillance technology to specific investigations of crime and
wrongdoing and bars long-term retention of this data in most
situations.256 Further, ALPR technology use by non-law enforcement

251.
Id.
252.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
253.
See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes supra note 89.
254.
See id. (listing the relevant ALPR statues for Maine, California, and New
Hampshire).
255.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2022).
256.
See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, supra note 89.
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officers or agencies is barred.257 In California, the Senate Committee
passed a bill in 2021 to limit ALPR data retention in order to block
nationwide license plate tracking programs.258 Previously, ALPR data
in the state could be retained for sixty days unless it was being used as
evidence or for the investigation of felonies.259 The “investigation of
felonies” exception results in the storage of ALPR data for years in
several circumstances depending on the jurisdiction.260 To prevent this,
on March 23, 2021, the Senate Judiciary Committee of California
passed SB-210, which restricts ALPR data significantly; the bill
requires deleting and destroying collected data within twenty-four
hours if it does not match a license-plate hotlist.261 Additionally, the bill
proposes annual audits to review ALPR search procedures and police
conduct, and also requires detailed records of all police access to ALPR
records.262
While these states have taken great steps in regulating ALPR,
an issue still lingers. ALPR technology, especially in recent years, has
become increasingly privatized.263 The companies who run these
databases are not bound within the confines of one set of state laws.264
This makes it very difficult to determine whether data from a scan that
is deleted or unavailable in one state is accessible by law enforcement
in another. It also raises the concern of whether law enforcement can
circumvent state restrictions by consulting with other police
departments. Additionally, it is unclear if law enforcement agencies
truly follow their governing states’ regulations. For example, a 2019
audit of four local law enforcement agencies in California found that the
agencies had accumulated large numbers of scans in their ALPR
databases and were holding these scans for longer than necessary, even

257.
See id.
258.
Mike Maharrey, California Senate Committee Passes Bill to Limit ALPR Data
Retention, Help Block National License Plate Tracking Program, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Mar.
25, 2021), https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2021/03/california-senate-committee-passesbill-to-limit-alpr-data-retention-help-block-national-license-plate-tracking-program/
[https://perma.cc/7RHM-Q4G7].
259.
See id.
260.
See CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413 (West 2022) (providing no limit on retention in the
exception).
261.
See Maas & Tsukayama, supra note 245.
262.
See id.
263.
See Brooks, supra note 37, at 11–13 (describing the rapid growth in the private
sector of ALPR databases).
264.
See, e.g., Gil Aegerter, License Plate Data Not Just for Cops: Private Companies Are
Tracking Your Car, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/license-plate-data-not-justcops-private-companies-are-tracking-flna6C10684677 [https://perma.cc/ZMM4-KC26] (July 19,
2013, 3:44 AM) (listing companies operating in Illinois, Texas, Florida, and California).
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though many were unrelated to criminal investigations.265 There were
also privacy concerns regarding the information’s lack of protection,
especially considering that two agencies were adding personal
information to the scans, such as names, addresses, birthdates, and
criminal charges of the vehicles’ assumed drivers.266 Further, in many
circumstances, the agencies were sharing their scans and data with
hundreds of other agencies without a clear explanation for doing so.267
While ALPR regulation enforcement is beyond this Note’s scope, this
audit reveals the need for clear-cut policy when it comes to regulating
ALPR nationwide.268
Federal legislation that would dictate the maximum amount of
time that ALPR data can be stored is a first step in the right direction.
This type of policy would address the concern of police departments in
different states having access to certain scans as a result of differing
local retention laws. Further, this legislation would uniformly regulate
the use of this technology and balance the privacy interests of US
citizens with the interests of US police forces. There is no doubt that
ALPR technology is a powerful crime-fighting tool and that its use
should not be banned outright, but regulations that limit when the
technology can be used and how long the data it produces can be stored
would ensure that it remains a tool rather than an unconstitutional
mass surveillance system.
C. Congress Should Create a Federal Agency to Better Regulate ALPR
Use by Law Enforcement and Other Actors
As ALPR technology has grown, law enforcement agencies have
shifted from using government databases to private databases which
boast impressive features, such as live tracking services and
AI-powered metrics.269 These private databases sometimes include a
driver’s personal information and license plate number.270 As of this
Note, numerous databases are competing to provide the best ALPR

265.
See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS 2 (2020),
https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4ZV-KYVA].
266.
See id. at 1.
267.
See id. at 2.
268.
See generally id. (“Law enforcement agencies must first create policies that set clear
guidelines
for
how
they
will
use
ALPR
data.
Setting
certain
expectations in writing through an ALPR usage and privacy policy helps ensure that agencies
operate their ALPR programs in a manner that better protects individuals’ privacy.”).
269.
See, e.g., PLATESMART, https://www.platesmart.com [https://perma.cc/TF8S-6SE3]
(last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
270.
See Díaz & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 44.
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coverage across the nation by aggregating as many scans as possible.271
The magnitude of this data cannot be understated, and the lack of clearcut cybersecurity standards of this technology poses a threat to national
security. This is detailed information being collected on essentially
every US citizen that uses a motor vehicle. There must be government
intervention that monitors and sets standards for all databases, both
public and private, to abide by, especially considering the rising number
of private databases emerging in this industry.
ALPR data has the potential to be used maliciously; thus, there
must be immediate government intervention to safeguard this data.
Therefore, Congress should establish a federal agency to ensure that
databases follow strict data security standards and guarantee that the
data is only accessible to appropriate officials. As the number of these
databases grow, it is important that they abide by the best practices
and privacy guidelines. There must be a government agency with clear
standards to ensure that databases adequately protect this
information. Additionally, having a federal agency audit and monitor
databases is crucial to ensure that this data is appropriately stored and
shared between authorized users (i.e., police departments). Further,
because US police departments are highly decentralized, it is not
uncommon for jurisdictions to share ALPR data amongst themselves.272
These information transfers are done through various means, and it is
important for them to be monitored so that sensitive information
remains in the hands of properly authorized actors.
Lastly, the federal agency proposed by this Note can combat
concerns of racial pretext raised by police use of ALPR. The proposed
agency should implement audits and collect data to determine whether
minority groups are disproportionately harmed as a result of the way
the technology is being used. Additionally, the proposed agency should
ensure that ALPR scanners are used uniformly across each police
department’s jurisdiction, rather than to target certain communities.
There are rising concerns that ALPR technology is being rapidly
implemented in minority communities to monitor and target these
demographics.273 Forming an agency that, at a minimum, monitors how
police departments use ALPR technology will help address this issue.
There are two perspectives to address regarding racial pretext
in police use of ALPR technology. On the one hand, ALPR advocates

271.
See, e.g., OPENALPR, https://www.openalpr.com [https://perma.cc/7SXZ-JR24] (last
visited Mar. 9, 2022).
272.
See Fash, supra note 22, at 87 (discussing why the decentralized nature of US police
forces leads to potentially improper use of ALPR technology).
273.
See Sciacca, supra note 78.
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argue that this technology combats racial profiling in policing.274 A
report from Riverland Technology highlights how ALPR scanners are
not influenced by subconscious bias or police officers’ overt personal
biases.275 However, while the report focuses on how ALPR scanners are
an automated technology—they function irrespective of police
involvement—it does not properly acknowledge how ALPR searches
themselves are still subject to racial bias.276 As discussed, ALPR
technology has been disproportionately and rapidly implemented by
law enforcement in areas with high minority populations.277 Although
the technology itself may be unbiased because it is automated, the
technology can be used to target minorities if law enforcement chooses
to install a high number of scanners in certain areas. As it stands, this
allows law enforcement to aggressively track minority populations.
V. CONCLUSION
ALPR poses a threat that the courts have long failed to fully
address—the threat of a government system of mass surveillance.278
Almost invisible to the naked eye, ALPR scanners across the nation
scan and collect data on millions of Americans every day.279 This data
is then manipulated to track and locate targets.280 The rapid
development and implementation of ALPR technology have left it in a
state which poses serious constitutional privacy concerns. As it stands,
the current judicial approaches to governing the police use of this
technology are inadequate. As a result, US police departments have
been able to access and use this powerful technology with little
constraint imposed.281 While ALPR technology has great
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crime-fighting potential, its use must be limited by the Fourth
Amendment. Further, the information gathered by this technology
must be effectively protected to prevent misuse. The solution to this
problem requires courts and Congress to work together to implement a
series of reforms. First, courts must establish standards which govern
when police can use ALPR technology in the first place. These
standards will ensure that ALPR remains a tool rather than a crutch in
American police forces. Second, lawmakers must propose federal
legislation to govern ALPR databases nationwide to (1) limit the
retention of this data, and (2) set clear standards for the aggregation of
this data. Finally, Congress should establish a government agency to
ensure that ALPR databases are adequately protecting the large
amounts of detailed information on US drivers they collect. Such an
approach will protect the privacy interests of US citizens across the
nation while allowing ALPR to continue to responsibly aid police in
fighting crime.
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